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A NOTE ON THE PREFERRED HEDGE INSTRUMENT 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Contrary to Battermann et al.'s (2000) claims, this paper shows that risk-averse exporters 
may produce less with fair commodity futures than with fair put options; moreover, they may 
prefer the latter instrument for hedging against its exchange rate risk.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The behavior of a risk-averse firm under exchange rate or price risk in the presence of 
commodity put options and/or futures has been analyzed in several recent studies. By 
assuming that put options are indivisible, Wong (2002) shows that a risk-averse firm 
produces less under uncertainty in the presence of fair indivisible put options than under 
certainty (or than that of a risk-neutral counterpart). Surprisingly, Battermann et al. (2000) 
show that the same result holds even when put options become divisible and that a 
risk-averse firm always prefers using fair commodity futures to using fair divisible put 
options for hedging. 
 
This paper shows using a counter-example that simple risk aversion does not guarantee 
Battermann et al.'s (2000) conclusions. The over-hedging behavior of a risk-averse exporter 
using fairly priced put options renders the payoff function non-monotonic and convex in the 
exchange rate risk making Battermann et al.'s proofs incorrect. It is shown that the 
monotonicity of the payoff function in the risk concerned is a key reason why Battermann et 
al.'s results hold under Wong's (2002) model with indivisible (as opposed to) put options. 
 
2. EXCHANGE RATE RISK AND HEDGING USING PUT OPTIONS 
 
An exporting firm produces a single output that is sold at competitive world price P  
denominated in a foreign currency. The firm faces a random foreign exchange rate S~  with 
distribution function G , probability density function g , mean F , realization S , and 
support [ ]HL SS , , where 0≥> LH SS .1 From now on, a ~ means that the variable is a random 
                                                 
1Battermann et al. (2000) does not distinguish random variable S~  from realization S  ; they use S   to 
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variable; the same variable without a ~ is its realization. The exporter's production cost 
C satisfies 0>′C  and 0>′′C . The exporter is risk-averse with utility function U  
satisfying 0>′U  and  0<′′U . 
 
Suppose a commodity put option with strike price K  becomes available. For each unit of 
the put option purchased, the firm receives 0 if S  is at or above K  and receives SK −  if 
S  falls below K . Following Battermann et al. (2000), assume that the put option is 
unbiased (or fair) with unit price  
         ( )[ ] ( ) ( )∫ −=−= KSL SdGSKSKER ,0,~max                       (1) 
where E is the expectation operator. After purchasing PZ  units of the put option,  the 
producer's profit given realization S of S~  is 
        
( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) [ ]⎩⎨
⎧
∈−−
∈−−+−=
HPPP
LPPPP
P SKSifRZXCSPX
KSSifRZSKZXCSPX
Y
,,
,,
             (2) 
which is equivalently to 
        ( ) ( )[ ]RSKZXCSPXY PPPP −−+−= 0,max .                 (3) 
 
The producer's problem is to choose ( )PP ZX , to maximize its expected utility 
 
       ( ) ( )[ ]{ } ( ).0,max∫ −−+−H
L
S
S PPP
SdGRSKZXCSPXU                (4) 
The first-order conditions are given by 
( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ){ } 0~~: **** =′′−=′′−∫ PPPSS PP YUXCPSESdGYUXCSPX HL                  (5)          
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∫ ∫ ′−′−KS SS PPP L HL SdGYURSdGYUSKZ **:    
                                                                                                                                                        
denote both. 
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( )[ ] ( ){ } 0~0,~max * =′−−= pYURSKE                          (6) 
 
where *PX  and 
*
PY  are the optimal values of PX  and PY , respectively. From now on, a * 
denotes the optimal value of a variable. As pointed out by Eeckhoudt et al. (1991), even in a 
non-production model, the second-order condition for the optimal choice of deductible 
insurance (and similarly put option) with a kinked payoff function is complicated. Therefore, 
following Battermann et al. (2000), it is assumed that the second-order condition for a 
maximum holds. 
 
Battermann et al. (2000) have correctly proved the following claim stating that a 
risk-averse exporting firm over-hedges by purchasing more put option units than what are 
needed for covering its foreign currency denominated revenue. 
 
Claim 1 .** PP PXZ >  
Notice carefully that Claim 1 implies that optimal payoff *PY first decreases in S and then 
increases in S with a kink at KS = . Clearly, *PY  is non-monotonic and convex in the 
exchange rate risk. This turns out to be very important to the forthcoming analysis. 
 
3. PRODUCTION AND HEDGING DECISIONS IN THE PRESENCE OF 
CURRENCY FUTURES 
 
Now, suppose fairly priced currency futures, instead of put options, are available. The firm 
chooses output level fX  and fZ  units of currency futures at unbiased forward price 
( )SEF ~= such that its profit at realization S of S~  equals 
 HKIBS/WPS/059-045 4 
( ) ( )SFZXCSPXY ffff −+−=  
Battermann et al. (2000) have correctly proved the following claim specifying that a 
risk-averse exporter chooses to fully hedge against its exchange rate risk when fairly priced 
currency futures are available: 
 
Claim 2 .** ff PXZ =  
With full hedging using fairly priced currency futures, the exporter's optimal profit *~fY is 
non-random. Battermann et al. (2000) prove the following certainty-equivalence result stating 
that in the presence of fair currency futures, a risk-averse exporter chooses its output level as 
if it is under certainty with fixed exchange rate F : 
 
Claim 3 ( ).*fXCFP ′=  
 
4. PRODUCTION DECISION IN THE PRESENCE OF PUT OPTIONS 
 
Battermann et al. (2000) show that all risk-averse exporting firms produce less in the 
presence of fair put options than in the presence of fair currency futures, i.e., ** fp XX < . 
Unfortunately, both their claim and its proof are incorrect. The following examples show that 
a risk-averse exporter's optimal output level may decrease or increase when fair put options 
are replaced by fair currency futures: 
 
Example 1 A case with .** fp XX > 2 
Suppose U is quadratic with ( ) 00 >+=′ YYU ξξ (where 00 >ξ is sufficiently large) and 
                                                 
2 A more detailed set of computation results for this example is available on request. 
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( ) 0<=′′ ξYU  for all Y  in the relevant range, 
( ) [ ]KS
K
SgKSS HL ,0,3
4
3
2,
2
1,1,0 ∈∀=====  and 
( ) ( ) [ ]1,,3
2
13
1 KS
K
Sg ∈∀=−= .Simple calculation gives .61=R   
 
The first step is to show that ( ) *** ppp PXZPX >−− .  It can be checked from (6), using 
integration by parts and the above assumptions, that 
( ) ( ) ( ) )( ( )∫∫ =′−−=′= 10** 10 SRdGSYUSdGSKKSYU KO pp  
      ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) dSdGRKYUZPX SpK pp ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −−′′−− ∫∫ 0*0 ** µµ  
                      ( ) ( )∫ ∫ ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡′′+ 1 0**K Spp dSRdGYUPX µ  
               ( ) ****
24
1
36
1
12
1
pppp PXZPXPX ξξξ +−−−= .                   (7) 
Assume by contradiction that ( ) *** ppp PXZPX ≤−−  . Substituting this and 0<ξ  into (7) 
gives 
.0
72
1
24
1
36
1
12
10 ** >−=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ++−≥ pp PXPX ξξ                (8) 
 
A contradiction! Therefore, ( ) .*** ppp PXZPX >−−  
 
Next, it can be checked that 125=F . Denote ( ) ( ) ( )∫ −=Ω SSL SdGFS µ . Simple calculation 
gives  
( )
24
1
24
5
63
4
3
4
12
5
21
0
21
0 0
23
−=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −=Ω∫ ∫ ∫KS SL SSdSddSS µµ .          (9) 
Similarly, it can be checked that 
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( ) .
144
1
24
5
63
2
3
2
12
5
1
21
1
21 0
23
−=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −=Ω∫ ∫ ∫HSK S SSdSddSS µµ         (10) 
Using first-order condition (5), integrating by parts, and realizing that ( ) *** ppp PXZPX >−−  
and 0<ξ , it can be checked that 
      ( )[ ] ( ) ( )∫ ′′−− H
L
S
S pp
SdGYUXCFP **    
   ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )∫ ∫ ′′−−′−= H
L
H
L
S
S
S
S ppp
SdGYUXCSPSdGYUPFS ***)(   
    ( ) ( )∫ ′−= H
L
S
S p
SdGYUPFS *)(  
    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∫ ∫ Ω′′−Ω′′−−= KS pSK ppppL H dSSYUXPdSSYUZPXP **2***  
    ( ) ( ) ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ Ω−Ω> ∫ ∫KS SKp L H dSSdSSPXP *ξ . 
0
144
5
144
1
24
1 *2* >−=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +−= pp XPPXP ξξ .                     (11) 
The inequality in (11) clearly implies that ( ) 0* <′− pXCFP  and hence ** fp XX >  as 
( )*fXCFP ′=  according to Claim 3 and 0>′′C . 
 
Example 2  A case with ** fp XX < .3  
Suppose ,,, LH SSU  and K follow the assumptions in Example 1. Assume now thatG is a 
uniform distribution with ( ) [ ]1,0,1 ∈∀= SSg . Simple calculation gives 81=R . 
 
Under the new set of assumptions, the first equality in (7) now gives 
( )[ ] ****
64
3
192
5
16
10 pppp PXZPXPX ξξξ +−−−= .                   (12) 
Suppose by contradiction that ( ) *** ppp PXZPX ≥−− . Substituting this and then 0<ξ  into 
(12) gives 
                                                 
3 A more detailed set of computation results for this example is available on request. 
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.0
96
1
64
3
192
5
16
10 ** <−=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ++−≤ pp PXPX ξξ                     (13) 
 
A contradiction! Therefore, ( ) *** ppp PXZPX ≤−− . 
 
Next, it can be checked that 21=F giving rise to 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −=−=Ω ∫ 2212 212 21
22
0
0
2 SdGFS
S
S µµµ .                 (14) 
Similarly,  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )SSdGFSS
S
S
H Ω=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −=−=−Ω
−
−∫ 2212212 21
221
0
1
0
2µµµ .       (15) 
(15) implies that  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∫ ∫∫ ∫ <Ω=−Ω=−Ω=Ω 021 210121 121 011 dSSTdTdSSdSS .                (16) 
Substituting (16) and ( ) *** ppp PXZPX <−−  into the third equality in(11) gives 
( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∫ ∫ ∫ =⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ Ω−Ω<′′−− HHSS ppp dSSdSSPXPSdGYUXCFP 0210 121*** ξ .           (17) 
The inequality in (17) implies that  
( ) 0* >′− pXCFP ,                               (18) 
and hence ** fp XX < as ( )*fXCFP ′=  and 0>′′C . 
 
5. NON-MONOTONIC, CONVEX PAYOFF AND SOME INTUITION 
 
To understand why simple risk-aversion does not guarantee ** fp XX < and why 
Battermann et al.'s (2000) proof is incorrect, notice that their proof relies critically on the 
following inequality: 
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( ) ( )[ ] 0~,~cov ** <′−′ pp XCPSYU .4 
To show that the above inequality holds, Battermann et al. (2000, footnote 4) suggest that 
( )[ ]{ } ( )[ ]{ }SKYUSgnCPSYUSgn pp ~,~cov~,~cov ** −′−=′−′  
such that the problem reduces to showing that ( )[ ] 0~,~cov * >−′ SKYU p . However, in the proof 
of the last inequality, Battermann et al. (2000, Appendix) have only attempted to show that 
( )[ ] 0~,~cov >−′ SKSU . According to (2) and Claim 1, it can be checked that *pY  is not 
monotonically increasing in S . In fact, *pY first decreases in S and then increases in S with a 
kink at KS = . Clearly, Sgn ( )[ ]{ }SKYU p ~,~cov * −′ , and Sgn ( )[ ]{ }SKSU ~,~cov −′  are not the 
same in general given only 0<′′U .  
 
Interestingly, it turns out that the non-monotonicity of the payoff function in the presence 
of put options is a crucial feature that distinguishes the model in this paper from that of 
Machnes (1992) and Wong (2002). Wong (2002) shows that simple risk aversion is sufficient 
to guarantee that a competitive exporting firm always produces more under certainty than 
under output price risk when it is provided with a fairly priced indivisible commodity put 
option.5 A close look at Wong's model suggests that his result relies on the fact that the payoff 
function is monotonically non-decreasing in output price risk. Translating Wong's model of 
output price risk to the model in this paper, it can be checked that in the presence of an 
indivisible put option with a fixed number of put option units, 0Z , equal to output level 0X , 
                                                 
4 Battermann et al. (2000) write (5) as ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] 0~,~cov~ **** =′−′+′−′ pppp XCPSYUXCPSEYUE  
Clearly ( )[ ] ( )[ ]{ } ( ) ( )[ ]{ }**** ~,~cov~ pppp XCPSYUSgnXCPSESgnXCFPSgn ′−′−=′−=′− . 
5 Wong's (2002) Proposition 2 states that in the presence of a fairly priced indivisible commodity put option, 
a risk-averse competitive firm always produces less compared to an otherwise identical risk-neutral firm. Clearly, 
the optimal output level of a risk-neutral firm equals  in the context of exchange rate risk. 
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the exporter's profit 
 ( ) ( )[ ] 0000 0,max PXRSKXCSPXY −−+−= .6                    (19) 
The firm's first-order condition (of choosing 0x ) is given by 
( ) ( )[ ]{ } ( ) ( )∫ ′⋅−−+′−= H
L
S
S
SdGYUPRSKXCSP *0
*
0 0,max0   
which can be simplified to 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( )[ ]*0
*
0*
0
,0,~max~cov
YUE
YUSKSPXCFP ′
′−+⋅−=′−                 (20) 
Equation (20) is analogous to Wong's (2002) equation 7. A simple inspection of (19) suggests 
that 0Y  is monotonically non-decreasing in S . Therefore, the covariance term in (20) is 
negative given 0<′′U , exactly as suggested by Wong (2002), such that  
                       ( ) 0*0 >′− XCFP                                  (21) 
and hence **0 fXX < according to Claim 3 as 0>′′C  . The non-monotonicity of *pY as discussed 
in Section 2 renders Wong's approach not usable when indivisible put options becomes 
divisible and are freely chosen by the exporter. A simple explanation of this is that the 
convexity of the payoff function possibly makes the overall utility of the exporter 
non-concave in the exchange rate risk even when its utility function is concave. 
 
6. THE CHOICE BETWEEN FAIR FUTURES AND FAIR PUT OPTIONS 
 
Battermann et al. (2000) argue that risk aversion alone is sufficient to guarantee that an 
exporter always prefers using fair commodity futures to using fair put options for hedging 
against its exchange rate risk. Unfortunately, their argument is based critically upon their 
incorrect claims that risk aversion alone guarantees that ** fp XX < and that (18) always holds. 
                                                 
6 Machnes' (1992) and Wong's (2002) papers actually deal with output price risk instead of exchange rate 
risk. Their model has been modified so that Wong's result can be directly compared to that in this paper. 
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Taking expectation on both sides of (3) gives ( ) ( )ppp XCFPXYE −=~ . Inequality(18)and 
Claim 3 imply that ( ) ( )[ ] [ ] ( )** ~~sup~sup~ pp
X
f
X
f YEYYEYE >== . One can now use Battermann et 
al.'s (2000, p.88) argument to show that  
( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )[ ]**** ~~~ ffpp YUEYEUYEUYUE =<< .                   (22) 
The first inequality in (22) follows from Jensen's inequality. The second inequality is due to 
( ) ( )** ~~ fp YEYE < .  
Notice that inequality (21) always holds such that Battermann et al.'s (2000) argument can 
be used to show that a risk-averse exporter prefers fair commodity futures to fair indivisible 
put options for hedging against its exchange rate risk. On the contrary, (18) does not hold in 
general such that the second inequality in (22)may be reversed. Therefore, the last conclusion 
may not hold when put options become divisible. Divisible put options are obviously more 
common than indivisible put options as suggested by Wong (2002). 
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